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STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ABELL

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ROBERT NATE ABELL,

Case No. 200001092-CA
Argument Priority: (15)

Defendant/Appellant.
***************************************

JURISDICTION
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1953, as amended), where it involves an appeal from
a court of record in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a first degree or capital
felony.
STATEMENT of ISSUES
The issue before the Court of Appeals is whether or not the trial court erred in
denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress or Dismiss regarding use of an administrative
check point. The questions raised pursuant to the motion to suppress or dismiss included
deficiencies in application and implementation of the administrative check point as the
Utah Supreme Court had previously ruled in the case of State v. Deboov, 388 Utah Adv.
Rep. 12, (Utah 2000); the search beyond enumerated purposes of the administrative plan
///
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contrary to this Court's ruling in State v Deherrera, 346 Utah Adv Rep 36 (Ut App 1998),
and the implementation of the administrative check point to focus upon out of state
motorists
STANDARD of REVIEW
Appellant believes that the central issue is one of law and interpretation of Utah law
and the appropriate standard of review is one of "correctness " The matter was presented
to the trial court based upon the submission of Defendant's motion to suppress and the
State's factual statements on the matter came from officer, Jeff Chugg at the preliminary
hearing and Officers Chugg and Squires at the hearing on Defendant's motion to
suppress The Defendant does not believe that the material issues of fact are in dispute
However, if in fact the matter turns on a factual disagreement, then the appropriate
standard for review would be "clearly erroneous" In as much as a challenge to this
judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, a review of those conclusions is for
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions

See

Bonham v Morgan, 788 P 2d 497 (Utah 1989) When faced with a question of statutory
construction, the reviewing court first looks to the plain language of the statute

CIG

Exploration, Inc , v Utah State Tax Commission, 897 P 2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995), see
also State v Larson, 865 P 2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)
///
///
///

Page 2 of 20

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory provisions which Appellant believes applicable, are as follows:
1.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1953, as amended).
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-104, et seq., (1953, as amended).
PRIOR JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

The prior judicial authority which Appellant believes applicable is from the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Deboov. 388 Utah Adv. Rep 12 (Utah 2000), and the
Utah Court of Appeals decision in State v. Deherrera, 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ut
App.1998), and it is the Appellant's contention that the trial court's ruling in the instant
case was inconsistent with this Utah prior judicial authority.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE of the CASE: This action concerns the Appellant, ROBERT NATE ABELL,
a Colorado adult resident who while traveling though Sevier County was stopped as part
of an administrative check point on the 1 st day of March, 2000. The application for the
administrative check point stop was similar to the application in the case of State v.
Deboov. before the Utah Supreme Court in that it designated multiple purposes, struck
down as having no compelling state interest to stop and search. However, in the instant
case, the application employed an administrative plan that went beyond the designated
purposes of the application and was implemented in a fashion that focused upon out of
state vehicles. The Defendant was stopped, detoured from the flow of traffic, and a full
search of his vehicle was conducted with the use of two (2) canine units. The search
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produced a small quantity of cocaine and marijuana The Appellant tested positive for
marijuana and had in his possession butane lighters, charged as drug paraphernalia The
Defendant was arrested and detained for several hours before taken to the Sevier County
Jail for processing
COURSE AND PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION On or about the 18th day of
April, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held and the Defendant was bound over, the trial
court finding probable cause On or about the 8th day of August, 2000, a hearing was held
on Defendant's motion to suppress or dismiss and the trial court denied the same by order
dated the 16th day of August, 2000 On or about the 14th day of November, 2000, the
Appellant entered into a conditional plea of guilty to all charges and was sentenced to
serve ninety (90) days injail, and thirty-six (36) months on supervised probation, the same
being stayed pending this appeal

The Notice of Appeal was filed on the 7th day of

December, 2000
STATEMENT of FACTS
1 On or about the 1 st day of March, 2000, the Appellant, while traveling northbound
on Interstate 70, through Sevier County, State of Utah, was directed by traffic control
devices and signage indicating "construction work" ahead to an administrative check point
stop that was set up at mile post 51, between Richfield and Salina, Utah See affidavit of
Defendants, paragraph 2, page 73 of the Record
Transcript at pages 5 and 6
///
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See also the Preliminary Hearing

2. The Appellant is an adult Colorado resident and was driving a vehicle with
Colorado plates. When stopped he was separated from the main traffic route and his
vehicle was searched as part of the administrative check point stop. See preliminary
hearing transcript at pages 6 and 7. (Pages of transcripts herein referred are attached as
Addendum D). See also affidavit of Defendant, paragraph 2-7, page 73, of the Record.
(The affidavit of Appellant is attached as Addendum C). Small quantities of cocaine and
marijuana were found in the search which was conducted by the use of two (2) canine
units. Id at page 10 and 75 respectively.
3. An application was made for an administrative check point stop along I-70 the
previous day, February 29, 2000. See the Record at page 77; Preliminary hearing
transcript at page 13; ( the Administrative Check Point Application is attached as
Addendum B). The application indicated publication of the check point would be published
in a local newspaper. Record at page 79. The application did not identify officers involved
except to give the name and rank of the officer in charge. Id at 80. There was no
identification of the use of canines nor was their use designated as a purpose within the
application to search for controlled substances except that one of the application's
designated purposes was to detect minors having in their possession alcohol or controlled
substances. Id at 78.
///
///
///
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4 The application set forth a traffic control plan but did not identify the messages
on the signs utilized in the plan as part the application 1 Id
5 The application was specific as to the instructions that would be given
pages 79-80

Id at

All law enforcement officers had an operation briefing and were further

instructed that there would be no deviation from the plan except by specific permission
from the officer in charge Id, see also preliminary hearing transcript at page 14
6

The most intrusive part of the process, unlike the circumstances in State v

Debooy, was the fact that the application did not specifically enumerate searching for
possession of controlled substances yet the implementation incorporated the routine use
of canine units for search

Nevertheless, there were several different enumerated

purposes ranging from promoting public safety to checking for equipment violations and
proof of insurance That would not have required such an extensive search procedure
Id at page 78 As noted in Debooy, checking for equipment violations is already a highly
regulated area without the need of enforcement through an administrative check point and
therefore calls into question the compelling state interest
7 Since illegal substances were found in the Appellant's vehicle, he was
handcuffed and left at the scene for several hours exposed to risk of harm and the

1

As for the signs used and the basis of proper notice, there is no question that the signage
was misleading and deceptive to motorists believing that the traffic control measures were for
highway construction and not for safety See Preliminary hearing transcript at page 17 This
smacks of entrapment However, Appellant did not raise the issue of entrapment at the trial level
and mentions the signage on this appeal for the purpose of showing a similar patten of deception
involved in the application and implementation of the administrative check point
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elements. See the Record at 75 and 76. The Appellant observed while in custody other
cars from the State of Colorado or other states stopped and searched. Cars from Utah
were allowed to go through without being stopped. Id.
8. On or about the 8th day of August, 2000, the Appellant moved to suppress and
the motion was denied by the trial court, on the 16th day of August, 2000. (A copy of the
trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum A). The trial court relying upon the State's
contention that the application in the instant case was more limiting in allowing officers to
inspect only the most obvious of vehicle equipment violations. See transcript on hearing
on motion to suppress at page 17.
9. On or about the 14th day of November, 2000, the Appellant entered into a
conditional plea of guilty to all charges and was sentenced by the trial court, the sentence
stayed pending this appeal. See Record at 124 to 128.
10. On or about the 7th day of December, 2000, the Appellant filed this Appeal for
review by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's judgment, denying Appellant's motion to
suppress or dismiss. See Record at 132.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress or dismiss and
in upholding an administrative check point similar to the application and circumstances
struck down in State v. Deboov. The implementation involves the use of officers and
procedures beyond the scope of that which is enumerated or could be reasonably inferred
///
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as part of the plan for enforcement under the application and in achieving the objective
determined by the judicial authority to be a clear and compelling State interest.
1. The application for the Administrative Check Point was too broad to meet
the restrictive requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-104 (1953, as amended).
Although use of administrative check points is authorized by statute, the Utah Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals have restricted its use and application to compelling State
interests and only allowed if proper and adequate provision is made for judicial scrutiny
and notice to the public.

The Courts also require that the implementation of the

administrative check point be made upon neutral criteria, which does not leave
discretionary considerations of search and seizure to the field officer and does not
compromise the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion. In State v. Deboov, 388 Utah
Adv. Rep 12 (Utah 2000), the Utah Supreme Court struck down the use of administrative
check points where the application set forth multiple enumerated purposes which did not
demonstrate a compelling State interest. The instant case is similar to Deboov and should
be struck down.
2. The search in the instant case goes beyond the enumerated purposes of
the administrative plan in a calculated but unacceptable procedure. The enumerated
purposes in the instant case did not identify searches for controlled substances as one of
its objectives. Likewise, the use of canine units as part of the searching procedure is not
set forth in the application affording the judicial authority the opportunity to scrutinize such
an intrusion upon the traveling public.
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3. The implementation of the Administrative Check Point was conducted in
a way that focused upon out of state vehicles and calls into question the compelling State
interest as designated in the application. Appellant's observations while arrested and
detained at the check point location for several hours was that only out of state vehicles
were being searched and Utah vehicles were allowed to continue without search. The
State will contend that was not the case but the Appellant's observations call into question
the compelling State interest justifying the use of an administrative check point with the
application designating multiple purposes of a safety nature when enforcement is
exercising a search procedure utilizing canine units to search out of state vehicles. The
Appellant contends that the circumstances show the State's use of the statutory procedure
as a pretext to conduct searches of vehicles and avoid judicial scrutiny and the Terry
standard of reasonable suspicion.
4. Since the administration check point violates the standard set in Debooy,
Appellant's motion to suppress should have been granted as the evidence served by the
search constituted "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" and the case should have been
dismissed. The trial court's attempt to disqualify the application of Debooy from the factual
circumstances in the instant case is unconvincing and focuses on the dicta portion of
Justice Durham's decision. There can not be an independent basis for justifying the
search in the instant case because Debooy forecloses that line of analysis. The trial
court's order is inconsistent with the reasoning and result of both Debooy and Deherrera
and should be overturned.
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ARGUMENTS
A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS OR SUPPRESS AND IN UPHOLDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE
CHECKPOINT SIMILAR TO THE APPLICATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES
STRUCK DOWN IN STATE V. DEBOOY.
The issue before the Court of Appeals is whether or not the trial court erred in
denying Defendant's motion to suppress or dismiss regarding an administrative check
point. The application in the instant case is similar to that considered by the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Debooy. Additionally, the application in the instant case was
improper because it utilized officers and procedures not enumerated in the application and
focused upon out of state vehicles.
POINT NO. I
The Application For The Administrative Check Point Was Too Broad To Meet The
Restrictive Requirements To Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-104 (1953, as amended),
The use of administrative check point stops in the state of Utah is statutorily
permitted. However, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have
restricted its application. In State v. Debooy. 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 2000), the Utah
Supreme Court struck down the use of an administrative check point, finding the same
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I and Section
14 of the Utah Constitution where an application designates multiple purposes and the
Page 10 of 20

State's compelling interest is not clear. In pertinent part the Supreme Court stated as
follows:
The check point in the instance case is far more intrusive than the check
points at issue in Martinez-Forte and Stiz. Those cases involved brief stops
in which the officers were searching for only one purpose, .... the present
case, the State has a clear compelling interest in promoting highway safety
in keeping drunk drivers off the road. Drunk driving presents a great danger
to all motorists and threaten the safety of others using the highway. A check
point such as the one Stiz can advance the State's interest. However, the
check point in the present case is not limited to preventing drunk driving. At
this check point, the police conducted sweeping inspections of license
plates, registration certificates, insurance certificates, drivers licences, seat
belt use, compliance with child restraint laws, vehicle eguipment violations,
and compliance with commercial vehicle regulations, in addition to checking
for driver under the influence of alcohol or other substances, as well as other
alcohol or controlled substances violations.
When many legal violations are searched for, the purpose of the check point
becomes less a highway safety measure, and more a pretext to stop all
vehicles to search for any and all violations of the law that might be
apparent. This generalized stop and search, of course occurred without any
individualized suspicion of a crime having been committed much less
probable cause. Id at pages 14 and 15 (emphasis added).
In the case of State v. Deherrera, 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ut App. 1998) the Utah
Court of Appeals similarly struck down the use of an administrative check point violating
Utah Law and the United States Constitution, finding it to be entirely too long and stating
that it did not specifically include all the names of officers authorized to conduct search
and the purposes and instructions given to the officers at the road went beyond the
statutory scope, violating the criteria of Sitz. See Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455,110S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990). The balancing test in Sitz, adopted
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by the Court of Appeals in Deherrera, emphasizes the implementation of a procedure
based upon neutral criteria, not left to officers' discretion in the field, and not compromising
the Terry standard for reasonable suspicion The trial court in Deherrera acknowledged
that an administrative check point, broadened to multiple purposes, was too intrusive upon
individual liberties, but denied Defendant's motion to dismiss upon a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding
that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence
obtained therefrom should have been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree " See
also Longsonv United States, 371 U S 471, 487-88, 83S Ct 407, 417 (1963)
In the instant case, the application for the administrative check point is very similar
to that found in the case of State v Debooy The trial court denied Defendant's motion to
suppress on the basis that this application limited officers to conducting an exterior
examination of vehicles, to make a cursory walk around the vehicles inspecting for plain
view evidence of violation, which was less discretionary than Debooy

The Appellant

contends that the trial court's rationale relies upon dicta in the Debooy case which
demonstrates the trial court's misunderstanding of Deboov's scope and holding Justice
Durham, as way of example mentions equipment violations as a particularly appalling use
of administrative check point The trial court has taken that to mean that this was the only
area of concern for the Court The Appellant contends that the matter is
///
///
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one balancing compelling state interests with that of protection of individual liberties and
that the use of multiple purpose application for check points diminishes the compelling
nature of the state's interest.
The trial court's analysis of the matter does not attempt to address how the slight
modification of the application of in the instant case effectively overcomes the problems
identified by Justice Durham in preserving a clear and compelling State interest that would
justify an intrusion upon individual liberties and ailowforthe administration of check points
with multiple purposes.
POINT NO. II
The Search In The Instant Case Goes Beyond The Enumerated Purposes Of The
Administrative Plan In a Calculated But Unacceptable Procedure.
The application in the instant case, similar to Deboov, enumerated seven (7)
separate purposes. These were as follows:
A. To promote a safe public environment for all persons using the State highway.
B. To inspect compliance with seatbelts and child restraint requirements.
C. To determine if drivers are impaired.
D.

To protect minors having been in their possession alcohol or controlled

substances.
E. To conduct exterior examination of the of vehicles for the require lights, turn
signals, and other exterior required safety devices.
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F

To conduct routine level three (3) inspections of commercial vehicles over

twenty-six thousand and one pounds (26,001) BGW
G Inspect the validity of license plates, registration certificates, proof of insurance
and drivers licenses
There was no designated purpose in the application specifying a canine aided
search for possession of alcohol or controlled substances

The use of canines could not

reasonably be used to achieve the designated purposes in the application except for that
for that purpose designated as B "to detect minors having in their possession alcohol or
controlled substances " Appellant and his passenger were not minors

As part of the

instruction given in the application, officers were to "request a driver's license, state
vehicle registration, and certificate and proof insurance" Officers [were] will be directed
to make a cursory walk around the vehicles inspecting from plain view evidence of the
above listed violations" (Emphasis added)

Also in the application, it states that

investigation with regard to criminal offenses, other than those enumerated, will be
pursued only if an officer, while complying with the instruction procedures, obtains
evidence or information constituting a reasonable suspicion of such independent criminal
conduct (Emphasis added)

See application at subsection M This procedure was not

c

followed in the Appellant's case
Perhaps the most disturbing use of this particular administrative check point is the
precalculated use of two (2) canine units

No designation of the use is made in the

application The use of a canine can not be reasonably understood as an implicit part of
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achieving the designated purposes set forth in the application

It appears that the

administrative check point application was itself used as a pretext to search vehicles for
possession of controlled substances or other criminal law violations without examination
or review by a judicial authority Moreover, the application fails to identify the canine units
as officers or to give instruction as to their use to the officers as part of the application and
appears to go beyond that which was intended under State v Deherrera, 346 Utah Adv
Rep 36 (Ut App 1998) In that case, the Court of Appeals stated
At the very least, those involved in deposing the administrative check
point plan and in seeking judicial approval must be encouraged to conform
with their actions in both State Statue and the Constitution Moreover, we
decry the mechanism by which the Utah County Attorney's Office sought to
enlarge the application of the administrative traffic check point statute
instead of presenting the judicial officer from who approval was sought with
a new and coherent plan each time a change was sought, the County
Attorney simply presented amendments, all contained within the same short
document, then referred to the original administrative check point plans
Each time the plan was presented, the County Attorney, and an officer of the
Court, and the judge approving the plan, as a judicial officer, had an
obligation to examine the entire plan in terms of the statutory requirements
In addition, had the County Attorney presented the plan and its amendments
in terms of the statute, and had the judicial officer reviewed them as part of
the plan either as procedure or as officers utilize to implement the
procedure Id at 38
As the Court of Appeals stated in Deherrera, it is difficult to see how the plan would
have been approved, and such a procedure followed The statute clearly states
requirements that were not followed in this case, such as the requirement that officers on
the plan's roster be listed by name Id at page 39 The fact that this entire procedure is
not mentioned as part of the administrative plan in the instant case, seems to even go
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farther afoul of that which concerned the Utah Court of Appeals in Deherrera. Clearly,
the judge approving the plan as a judicial officer had no opportunity in this case to even
consider whether the implementation of canines for vehicle search would be justified as
a proper procedure to advance a compelling state interest.
Notwithstanding, this use of canine units was one clearly calculated and
contemplated and Appellant is forced to assume was done so purposefully and deceitfully
to omit from the application those procedures that law enforcement thought would be
questionable to avoid judicial scrutiny.
POINT NO. Ill
The Implementation of the Administrative Check Point Stop was Conducted in a way
That Focused Upon out of State Vehicles and Therefore Calls into Question the
Compelling State Interest in the Designated Purposes of the Application.
While Appellant was detained at the administrative check point and before being
processed at the Sevier County Jail, he had adequate opportunity to observe the
implementation of the administrative check point stop by law enforcement.

His

observations suggest that the focus was not consistent with the criteria set forth in the
balancing test of Sitz, mentioned above or designated as purposes with the application,
but in fact focused upon out of state motorists. His observations suggest that the only
vehicles that were detained or removed from the flow of traffic were vehicles of other
states. This implementation calls into question the designated purposes enumerated in
the application and their compelling state interest. Even if the Court were to assume that
the designated purposes constituted a valid stop, it seems that if the State had any
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compelling interest in the designated purposes, that the focus would be upon Utah
vehicles and not out of state vehicles as was implemented at the traffic control stop.
Again, through the implementation there is a strong indication of a plan focused upon
stopping all vehicles to search for any and all violations of the law, particularly the
possession of controlled substances, through the use of a generalized stop and search
which did not meet the criteria of the Terry test involving reasonable suspicion.
POINT NO. IV
Since The Administrative Check Point Stop Violates The Standard Set In State v.
Deboov, Appellant's Motion To Suppress Should Have Been Granted as the Evidence
Constituted "Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree" and the Case should have been Dismissed.
The Appellant argues that circumstances in the instant case are so similar to those
addressed in State v. Deboov, that the trial court's attempted to distinguish the same on
a slight change in the language of one of the enumerated purposes in the application is
insufficient to disqualify the application of Deboov to the present circumstances. The
Appellant further asserts that the trial court was in error in attempting to do so and further
asserts that the facts and circumstances of the instant case do not lend themselves to any
limitation of the Deboov standard. As in Deboov, even if the trial court attempted to
establish an independent justification for stop, excluding the administrative check point,
the Utah Supreme Court made clear that such analysis could not prevail. The check point
is what affords law enforcement the opportunity to observe law violations directly or
reported. Consequently, if the administrative check point fails to meet the statutory criteria
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as applied by the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the evidence obtained
from the use of such an improper administrative check point must be suppressed as "fruit
of the poisonous tree" and the case dismissed. The Appellant asserts that the trial court
was in error in failing to follow the prior rulings of the Utah Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court regarding this subject, and therefore the trial court's decision should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above Appellant requests that the
Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's judgment and order and dismiss or in the
alternative to remand with instruction to the trial court to rule consistently with Utah law
under the circumstances together with such other and further relief as to this Court
appears equitable and proper.
DATED this

day of

, 20

.

J. BRYAN JACKSON
Attorney for Appellant Abel I
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R DON BROWN
SEVIER COUNTY ATTORNEY
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDUM
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ADDENDUM A
COPY OF COURT RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

DISTRICT COURT, SEVIER COUNTY, UTAH
895 East 300 North
Richfield, UT 84701
Telephone: (435) 896-2700 Fax: (435) 896-8047
1

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
ROBERT NATE ABELL,
Defendant.

.Case No. 001600077
Assigned Judge

K. L. McIFF

Officers of the Utah Highway Patrol obtained court approval for an administrative traffic
checkpoint on Interstate Highway 70 located in Sevier County. The purposes of the checkpoint
were set forth as follows:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

To promote a safe public environment for all persons using the state highways.
To inspect compliance with seat belt and child restraint requirements.
To determine if drivers are impaired.
To detect minors having in their possession alcohol or controlled substances.
To conduct exterior examination of vehicles for the required lights, turn signals,
and other exterior required safety devices.
F. To conduct routine level three inspections of commercial vehicles over 26,001
pounds GVW.
G. To inspect the validity of license plates, registration certificates, proof of insurance
and driver licenses.
The officers participating in the operation received, among others, the following

instruction:

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 001600077, Page -2This administrative checkpoint is a driver license and registration check and is to detect
and apprehend individuals suspected of violating the following regularly enforced state
laws driver license violations, registration violations, proof of insurance violations,
equipment violations, drivers license, state vehicle registration certificate and valid proof
of insurance Officers will be directed to make a cursory walk around the vehicle
inspecting for plain view evidence of the above listed violations
Other relevant facts will be set forth as part of the legal analysis
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The principle thrust of the defendant's argument is that the application and authorization
for the administrative traffic checkpoint is overly broad in light of the recent Utah Supreme Court
decision in State v Debooy, 388 Utah Adv Rep 12 (Feb 2000) The analysis is not complex In
Debooy, the officers were authorized to "inspect and/or detect

vehicle equipment violations"

There were no further limitations or instructions The Debooy court considered this authorization
to be too "sweeping" and its meaning unclear There were no guidelines as to how the officers
were to conduct their inquiry and the extent thereof was left entirely to their discretion The court
reasoned that some "officers might choose to check only the headlights, while others might be
subjected to a full 'diagnostic' exam "
The State claims that the application and authorization in the present case took into
consideration the holding in Debooy and is sufficiently limited in scope to be valid The
limitations appear to be these The officers were directed "to conduct exterior examination of
vehicles" and "to make a cursory walk around the vehicle inspecting for plain view evidence"
of the violations, which were listed in the application

^ ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 001600077, Page -3It appears that the State might be probing the outer limit with the application and
authorization employed in this case On balance, this Court has determined that they are not so
"general" and so "unlimited" as to violate either the Utah or federal constitution The application
and authorization are here upheld principally for the reason that the type of encroachment
approved can be conducted in a minimal amount of time and with a minimum amount of invasion.
Unless something is in "plain view"1 the examination for equipment violations is at an end The
officers discretion is not unbridled and the acceptable procedure not without guidance
The defendant also objects to the use of two canines who detected the presence of
controlled substances This however did not occur until Officer Chugg, who had previously made
some 1500 drug arrests and smelled burnt marijuana on hundreds of occasions, detected the odor
of burnt marijuana in the vehicle This further detention and investigation and use of resources
was contemplated by paragraph M of the Application and Authorization which provided as
follows
Investigations with regard to criminal offenses, other than those above enumerated, will be
pursued only if an officer, while complying with the instructed procedure, obtains evidence
or information constituting a reasonable suspicion of such independent criminal conduct
Defendant next argues that the officers were stopping only vehicles with Colorado license
plates The State's evidence was to the contrary and the arresting officer gave undisputed
testimony that he took formal action against persons in seven different vehicles two were from

Both counsel agree that "plain view" includes anything detectable by any of the physical senses

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 001600077, Page -4Utah, one was from Illinois, one from Kansas and three from Colorado. The Court concludes that
there was no selective enforcement involving only vehicles from a particular state.
Finally, defendant complains that while stopped a trucker, who was also stopped, accused
defendant of speeding or reckless driving. This occurred after the presence of controlled
substances was detected and was simply a non-factor. The situation is different than present in
Debooy where the illegal checkpoint produced the only evidence.
ORDER
For the reasons aforesaid, the defendant's motion to suppress is denied.
Dated this ( ( Q day of August, 2000.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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method indicated:
Addressee

, 2000 a copy of the above was sent to each of the following by the

Method

R. Don Brown
Sevier County Attorney
835 East 300 North, Suite 100
Richfield, UT 84701

(M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax)
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Addressee

Method

J. Bryan Jackson
Attorney at Law
157 East Center Street
P.O. Box 519
Cedar City, UT 84721-0519

(M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax)
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ADDENDUM B
COPY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHECK POINT
APPLICATION

IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of:
Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint No.

APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
FOR ADMINISTRATION TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT
Judge Kent Nielsen
Case No.

APPLICATION

Pursuant to the Provision of Section 77-23-104, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, I,
lieutenant Keith D. Squires, of the Utah Highway Patrol, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make
ipplication for authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following plan:
I.

Location: Interstate 70, milepost 51
(The milepost listed is an approximation and closest to the location area.)
Geograpliical and topographical information is as follows: Interstate 70 at milepost 51 is a level,
two-lane with wide emergency lanes, east- and westbound freeway. Traffic control will be
coordinated through and approved by the local UDOT Safety Engineer. A large median crossover
will be the staging area, it is visible from Vi mile in either direction. The area has plenty of room to
move traffic in a safe fashion and there are no obstructions (trees, etc.). The median is planted in
short grass with no obstructions for east- or westbound traffic. The roadway is above the valley
floor. A diagram of the site including traffic contiol specifications is attached.

II.

Dates/Times: March 1, 2000, 0700-1900 hours; and March 29, 2000, 0700-1900 hours.

DDL

Sequence of traffic to be stopped:
All automobiles, station wagons, vans, pickup trucks, recieational veliicles, and commercial vehicles
will be stopped. In the event that stopped traffic exceeds ten vehicles, all traffic will be waved through
the checkpoint until only six vehicles are waiting. Commercial vehicles over 26,001 pounds may be
checked by U.T.I.P. and field personnel. A level three inspection will be conducted on all commercial
vehicles over 26,001 pounds GVW. The inspection and inquiry procedures are estimated to require
approximately 30 seconds duration except on commercial vehicles over 26,001 pound GVW, which
generally take 1 Vi minutes.
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Purpose:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

To promote a safe public environment for all persons using the state liighways.
To inspect compliance with seat belt and child restraint requirements.
To determine if drivers are impaired.
To detect minors having in their possession alcohol orcontrolled substances.
To conduct exterior examination of veliicles for the required lights, turn signals, and other exterior
required safety devices.
F. To conduct routine level tliree inspections of commercial veliicles over 26,001 pounds GVW.
G. To inspect the validity of license plates, legislation certificates, proof of msurancc and diivcr
licenses.

V.

Rank of Officcr(s) in Charge: Equipment:
A. Agencies Involved:
Utah Highway Patrol - Utah Department of Public Safety
Sevier County Sheriffs Office
(All individual officers participating will be listed on the after action report.)
Rank of Officer In Charge:
Command level officer - Lieutenant. Keith D. Squires; Supervisor - Sergeant. Lance Bushnell.
Minimum number of officers involved: Six.
B. Equipment:
1. Signs, Cones and Barrels
2. Police vehicles and emergency lights
3. UHP Breath Alcohol Testing Mobile Unit
4. 48,f x 48" diamond-shaped, orange warning signs will be placed 1500, 1000, and 500 feet
prior to the checkpoint. Marked patrol veliicles will be positioned at the checkpoint and
orange reflective cones and barrels will be used to direct the traffic flow. Uniformed
officers will be present to direct traffic.
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VI.

VTL

Advance Notice:
An article announcing these administrative checkpoints has been published in the Riclifield Reaper
Newspaper on January 26, 2000.
Instructions:
A. All enforcement officers will be given a copy of this plan at an operational briefing to be held
before the checkpoint. Command and supervisory level UIIP personnel will specifically outline
the purpose and procedures to be followed by all participating officers.
D. Any deviation from the plan will require specific permission from the officer in charge. Any
deviation must be documented by him as to the reason for, nature of, and effect of any
deviation.
C. The checkpoint site will be set up approximately one hour in advance.
D. If a violation is encountered, the vehicle will be detained at the side of the checkpoint in a safe
area as shown on the diagram for a reasonable amount of time in order to take appropriate
enforcement action.
E. In the event that all personnel are involved in enforcement or traffic becomes unduly delayed,
the checkpoint will be discontinued to alleviate the traffic delay. When all contacts have been
processed and/or traffic flow returns to normal, the checkpoint will again be operational and
resume the outlined procedures.
F. An after action report will be prepared by the officer in charge of the checkpoint, reviewed by
the command level supervisor and p r e s s e d to the issuing magistrate.
G. The officer in charge of the checkpoint shall be available to exhibit a copy of this plan and
signed authorization to any motorist who has been stopped at the checkpoint, upon request of
the motorist.
H. This administrative checkpoint is a diiver license and registration check and is to detect and
apprehend individuals suspected of violating the following regulaily enforced state laws: driver
license violations; registration violations; proof of insurance violations; equipment violations;
safety inspection violations; alcohol and DUI violations. Officers will be instructed to request a
drivers license, state vehicle registration certificate and valid proof of insurance. Officers will
be directed to make a cursory walk around the vehicle inspecting for plain view evidence of the
above listed violations.
I. Procedure: Officers will set up previously described traffic control prior to briefing. All officers
involved will meet at 0730 hours at the administrative checkpoint location where they will be
briefed as to purpose of the checkpoint, uniform observation and stopping procedures, specific
information to request, safety concerns, types of violations to be observed, roadblock
assignments, and reasonable detainment of motorists. Citizens will not be delayed longer than is
reasonable to check driver licenses, registrations, proof of insurance certificates and to observe
for detectable violations visible from the outside of the vehicle. Appiopriate enforcement will be
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taken on any observed violation and motorists will be detained only so long as necessary to
complete the appropriate enforcement. Commercial vehicles over 26,001 pounds GVW may be
detained long enough to conduct level three inspections.
Safety consciousness for officers and motorists will be maintained throughout the entire
roadblock, and potential unsafe situations will be reported immediately to the officer in charge
of the checkpoint.
Overall on-scene supervision of the roadblock is under the direction of the officer in charge.
That responsibility will fall upon the UIIP Section 10 Lieutenant when he is on scene and by the
supervising UHP Sergeant when the Lieutenant is not present.
Each enforcement officer involved will keep a record of his/her enforcement and provide this
information to the officer in charge at the completion of his shift.. The information required is:
1. Type of violation
2. Type of enforcement
3. Number
4. Total
Investigations with regard to criminal offenses, other than those above enumerated, will be
pursued only if an officer, while complying with the instructed procedure, obtains evidence or
information constituting a reasonable suspicion of such independent criminal conduct.

23
Dated this — —

day of February, 2000

^tU46<&
Lieutenant Keith D. Squires
UHP Section 10 Commander
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ADDENDUM C
COPY OF APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION

J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C.
J. BRYAN JACKSON, USB #4488
Attorney for Plaintiffs
157 East Center Street
Post Office Box 519
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519
(435) 586-8450

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANTS
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

)
Case No. 001600077 FS

ROBERT NATE ABELL,

)

Defendant

)

Judge: David L Mower

J
STATE of
COUNTY of

)
)ss
)

We, GARY ANTHONY CALABRO and ROBERT NATE ABELL. do each of us
individually and together make this Affidavit of our own personal knowledge and of our own
free will do depose and state as follows:
///

///
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1. That each of us is a resident of the State of Colorado and that we make this
affidavit based upon our personal information which we observed first hand and that we
make this affidavit voluntarily and of our own free will.
2. On or about the 151 day of March. 2000, we were traveling north bound on
Interstate 70 toward Colorado through the State of Utah when we can upon an area which
appeared to be traffic control and which the posted signage indicated was for the purpose
of construction work ahead.
3. That the traffic control devises consisted of signs, cones and other lane directing
devices which brought all traffic into a single lane.
4. That we were required to stop behind several vehicles including one (1) semitruck While waiting in line with the other vehicles, the Defendant, ROBERT NATE ABELL,
did undo his seatbelt and rolled the window down.
5. Thereafter, our vehicle was approached by an officer who identified himself as
officer Chugg and requested that we provide him with proof of I D , registration and
insurance.
6. That the Defendant Mr ABELL, informed the officer that the car was a rental car
and Mr ABELL handed the officer the copy of the rental agreement which had been kept
in the jockey box.
7. That without further discussion, the officer told us that we were to pull over into
a separate lane, "'staging area'.
///
///
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8. That Mr. ABELL asked the officer why they were being asked to pull out of the
main lane of traffic and into a different area and the officer simply informed Mr. ABELL and
myself that it was to "straighten tilings o u t \
9. That once we pulled over into the staging area, the officer requested permission
to search the vehicle The Defendant, ROBERT NATE ABELL. the driver and responsible
party for the vehicle, refused permission for a search and requested that the officer inform
him as to what was going on.
10. The staging area was within a clear and unobstructed view of the main lane of
traffic for at least a half a mile in either direction.
11. The officer informed Mr, ABELL that he believed that Mr. ABELL was driving
under the influence The officer requested that Mr. ABELL perfor m field sobriety tests Mr.
ABELL agreed to perform such tests.
12. Mr. ABELL performed all of the field tests as he was instructed
13. The Defendant, GARY ANTHONY CALABRO, was able to observe the tests
and particularly Mr. CALABRO was able to over hear the instruction that was given to the
Defendant, ROBERT NATE ABELL and observe him performing the tests and Mr
CALABRO states that Mr, ABELL performed the test just as he was instructed, particularly,
Mr CALABRO notes that while the officer informed Mr ABELL to touch his nose with the
tip of his finger, by demonstrating the instruction the officer in fact touched his nose with
the pad of his finger which Mr. ABELL duplicated in his performance of the test

In

addition, Mr CALABRO while watching closely how Mr ABELL performed the test and was
///
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not able to distinguish any particular time when Mr ABELL was slow or delayed in putting
his hand to his side t but on each occasion it appeared to be as the officer had directed.
14.

Mr. CALABRO also notes that he observed Mr. ABELL perform the test

estimating when 30 seconds had passed and Mr CALABRO believes that Mr. ABELL was
able to do so within only a few seconds of estimating the actual 30 seconds.

Mr.

CALABRO further noted that Mr ABELL was alert, he was able to maintain his own
balance without assistance, he was able to follow the instructions that were given to him
to the letter and he was able to operate the motor vehicle that day from Las Vegas,
Nevada to the check point stop.
15

That at the time of the Preliminary Hearing we were informed that the rental

agreement allegedly had the odor of marijuana on it

We have retained the rental

agreement and it has no such odor as far as we are able to detect, and never had such
odor,
16, That the vehicle was searched and we were detained for approximately four (4)
hours at the staging area where we were able to observe the traffic as it went through the
traffic control stop We observed that there were many cars that were allowed to proceed
which had Utah plates even though many of the occupants did not have seatbelts on as
far as we could see. We did also notice that nearly all of the cars with Colorado plates
were asked to pull into the staging area and were searched. We further observed that
most of the people that were taken to the Sevier County Correctional Facility were in fact
people from Colorado.
///
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17. We observed that our vehicle was searched by two (2) dogs and that while the
Defendant, GARY CALABRO, consented to allow his luggage to be searched, the officers
had already started searching with the dogs prior to receiving such consent. We also
observed that the vehicles were being searched before the Defendant, ROBERT NATE
i

ABELL, had completed the performance of the three (3) field sobriety tests which were
being conducted.
18. After being at the scene for four (4) hours, it was our impression that cars from
the State of Utah were allowed to go through the administrative check point stop without
detainment unless there were major problem that were readily visible regarding their
vehicle or if it appeared that the driver of the vehicle was obviously under the influence of
a controlled substance. However, it was our further observation that nearly all cars from
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
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the State of Colorado, with very few exceptions, were required to pull over into the staging
area and those vehicles were searched for what appeared to be no reason.
FURTHER AS AFFIANT WE SAYETH NAUGHT

DATED this M

day of

7^ ^ 1

20 __ 6 °

ROBERT
Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO ME t h i s ^ / day of J ^
20(^

My Commission Expires

My <~ .. ...sjon Expires
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ADDENDUM D
COPY OF VARIOUS PORTIONS OF TRANSCRIPTS
FOR PRELIMINARY MOTION
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2

taking place on that date.
A.

I'd been asked as a K-9 officer-to assist with an

3

administrative checkpoint that was to take place on 1-70 at

4

mile marker 51.

5

THE COURT: Where is 51?

6

THE WITNESS: Excuse me, I'd estimate it about four

7

miles west of Salina.

8

THE COURT: Southwest on the interstate?

9

THE WITNESS: Yes, on the interstate.

10
11
12

THE COURT: Thank you.
Q.

BY MR. BROWN: And you did take —

you did participate

in that activity; did you not?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And in conjunction with that activity did you have

15

occasion to interact with the two defendants?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Could you explain to the Court what was occurring when

18

you first observed the two defendants.

19

A.

Yes, I was assisting with the eastbound traffic at

20

that time.

There were currently no vehicles when their vehicle

21

approached.

I observed them approaching, neither subject was

22

wearing a seatbelt, and the windows rolled down, and I motioned

23

for them to stop next to where I was standing.

24

Q.

And did they do so7

25

A.

Yes.

-61 I

Q.

What next happened?

2

A.

I asked the driver for his —

I asked both subjects

3

for I.D.

4

weren't wearing seatbelts.

5

they had been wearing them until they came around the corner

6

about a half mile back.

7

insurance, at which time they told me it was a rental car and

8

I was given a rental agreement.

9
10
11

Q.

I explained the reason for that was because they
The driver himself told me that

I also asked for registration and

Okay, and upon observing that rental agreement was

there anything about it that caused you concern?
A.

I observed that the rental agreement showed that the

12

vehicle was overdue.

It also showed that it had listed some

—

13

the areas where they were allowed to have the vehicle, and Utah

14

was not one of them.

15

Q.

What else did you observe that caused you concern?

16

A.

While I was talking to the occupants, I believed that

17

I could smell the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle, and

18

on the rental agreement that I had.

I also noticed that the

19

driver appeared to be very nervous.

He had a quiver in his

20

voice.

21

vest, despite how cold it was and his windows being down.

Also, he was only wearing a small vinyl or leather

22

Q.

Which one was the driver?

23

A.

Excuse me.

24

Q.

Which one was that?

25

A.

The taller subject, seated far to the right of me.

The driver was Mr. Abell.

-71

Q.

All right.

Thank you.

T'hen what happehed?

2

A.

I asked them to pull over into the lane that we had

3

designated for the vehicles to be in while they waited for

4

citations or other checks to be performed.

5

Q.

And did they do so?

6

A.

They did.

7

Q.

Then what happened?

8

A.

When I asked the driver to pull over there, he seemed

9

to become even more nervous and said, "Why am I moving over to

10

this lane?"

At which time I explained that it was to allow the

11

other traffic to go by while I took care of the situation.

12

Q.

Okay, and then what happened?

13

A.

I also saw that there was a boot knife sticking in the

14

—

below the radio in the console there.

15

Q.

Were you also advised of a citizen complaint?

16

A.

Yes.

When I returned to my car to issue citations

17

for the seatbelt offenses that I observed, one of the other

18

troopers approached me and told me that a semi driver who had

19

been stopped behind the vehicle in the roadblock had mentioned

20

that these two —

21

reckless manner and that he wanted to sign a complaint against

22

them.

23

the trooper.

24
25

Q.

or that the vehicle was being driven in a

He was at that time given a statement to write up from

Okay, and in fact later on you were provided with the

statement from the driver?

-101

A.

Excuse me?

2

Q.

You did inspect the vehicle; you did search the

3

vehicle?

4
5

A.
I

At that time he told us where the marijuana was and

what it was in.

What we decided to do was remove the baggage
I

6

that was in the front of the vehicle, and we put the dogs on

7

those specifically.

8
9

There was a camera case, a couple of bags.
a hard side —

There was

what I call makeup-type suitcase, and both dogs

10

indicated the odor of narcotics on both the camera case where

11

he said the marijuana was, and on the hard side case.

12

Q.

And were those items inspected?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

What did you find?

15

A.

I found in the camera case was the container with

16

marijuana that the driver had described, and in the hard side

17

case we found a bindle of a white powdery substance, which when

18

we later tested with a NIC kit tested positive for cocaine.

19

Q.

Okay, and then what happened?

20

A.

Then at one time the other dog had indicated also on

21

the center console of the car, and the driver had said to him

22

—

23

that that's where his pipe was. but he couldn't remember where

24

it was, and at one point he asked the passenger, Mr. Calabro,

25

asked him if he remembered where he had put his pipe.

when he was told that the dog had indicated there, he said

To which
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training in terms of substance detection?

2

A.

I'd say in the neighborhood of 200 hours.

3

Q.

So 200 hours in the course of six years?

4

A.

Over six years.

5

Q.

How much training have you had in the last year?

6

A.

In the last year?

Oh, I would say if I count the K-9

7

training that I do with controlled substances, that it would be

8

nearly 40 to 50.

9
10

Q.

And has that been primarily in the state of Utah or in

any other state?

11

A.

The one class I mentioned was in Arizona.

12

Q.

I see.

13

A.

It was in Page.

14

Q.

Page, Arizona.

In Phoenix or

—

Okay, and the other hours that you

15

have attended, has that been through the Utah Highway Patrol

16

or has it been through some other agency?

17

A.

Most of that would be the highway patrol.

18

Q.

I see.

19

A.

I was the contact officer, yes.

20

Q.

You were the contact officer, and this was basically a

21

Were you the supervising officer on the stop?

checkpoint stop; is that correct?

22

A,

Yes, it was.

23

Q.

An application had been filed with Judge Nelson and

24
25 I

had been approved?
A.

I believe that was the Judge's name, yes.

-141
2

Q.

And there were certain procedures that were to be

followed pursuant to that?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

You were aware of those procedures at that time?

5

A.

I was at the briefing where they were explained.

6

Q.

Now, was that briefed at the time of the checkpoint

7
8
9

stop or was that —
A.

was there a separate briefing?

There was a briefing first thing in the morning, about

07:30 hours.

10

Q.

At your office?

11

A.

At the scene, at the checkpoint.

12

Q.

Okay.

Now, designated in the application it indicates

13

that there were to be six officers on the scene at the time; is

14

that correct?

15

officers involved would be six?

16
17

A.

Is that what you understood?

Okay, a minimum number, yeah.

Minimum number of

I was going to say,

there was a lot more than six.

18

Q.

Were there?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

At the time that these stops were made

—

21

THE COURT: How many?

22

THE WITNESS: How many do I guess there was?

23

THE COURT: Yes.

24

Q.

25

involved?

BY MR. JACKSON: Yeah.

Do you remember how many were
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2

Q.

I see.

On the diagram doe's it show the signing that

was to be used?

3

A.

Yes, it does.

4

Q.

Signs, cones and barrels, and where they were to be

5

placed •

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

In looking at that diagram —

I haven't seen it yet,

8

but in looking at that diagram, does it fairly depict the way

9

the checkpoint was conducted in the field or along Interstate

10

15 at that time?

11

A.

It looks accurate to how it was when I was there.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

Did you use diamond shaped —

four-foot diamond

shaped signs?

14

A.

Did I?

15

Q.

Do you remember if those were used?

16

A.

They were there, yes.

17

Q.

What was said on them?

18

A.

"Road Work Ahead," was on the first one, I believe.

19

" Right Lane Closed Ahead" was the next group, and I think there

20

was a sign that showed that you had —

21

Q.

the lanes merged.

So there wasn't a sign that indicated that there was

22

a checkpoint, but rather that the signs were more dealing with

23

road construction?

24

A.

That's what it seems like to me, yes.

25

Q.

Was there any notification in the signing along this

1

of the vehicle, and anything else that they could observe in

2

plain view from the outside of the vehicle.

3
4
5

Q.

Now why would you do that, particularly in light of

the language in DeBooy regarding equipment violations?
A.

Well the reason that I would do that is just to be

6

more specific and limit the, ah, the discretion of the

7

officers, as far as how they, ah, conduct themselves and what

8

they ask for.

9

Q.

Do you recall the language under DeBooy where Judge

10

Durham was particularly offended by the fact that the previous

11

DeBooy application had included inspection of vehicle

12

violations?

13

A.

14

Do you recall reading that in DeBooy?
MR. BROWN:

Well, Your Honor, I think that the

15

DeBooy decision speaks for itself.

The officer has made

16

changes based o n — o n DeBooy.

17

interpretation of DeBooy.

I suppose that's up for--I suppose

18

that's for you to decide.

But we can argue all night long

19

about whether DeBooy, ah—well we can't.

20

night long as to whether it prohibits vehicle safety problems.

Ah, now counsel wants an

We can't argue all

21

MR. JACKSON:

22

MR. BROWN:

But it certainly doesn't restrict it.

23

THE COURT:

All right.

24
25

I'll restate the question, Your Honor.

All right.

Restate the

question.
MR. JACKSON:

Can I approach, Your Honor?

